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Although the theory of memetics appeared highly promising at the beginning, it
is no longer considered a scientific theory among contemporary evolutionary
scholars. This study aims to compare the genealogy of memetics with the
historically more successful gene-culture coevolution theory. This comparison
is made in order to determine the constraints that emerged during the internal
development of the memetics theory that could bias memeticists to work on the
ontology of meme units as opposed to hypotheses testing, which was adopted by
the gene-culture scholars. I trace this problem back to the diachronic development
of memetics to its origin in the gene-centered anti-group-selectionist argument
of George C. Williams and Richard Dawkins. The strict adoption of this
argument predisposed memeticists with the a priori idea that there is no evolution
without discrete units of selection, which in turn, made them dependent on the
principal separation of biological and memetic fitness. This separation thus
prevented memeticists from accepting an adaptationist view of culture which, on
the contrary, allowed gene-culture theorists to attract more scientists to test the
hypotheses, creating the historical success of the gene-culture coevolution theory.
1. Introduction
Since the second half of the nineteenth century scholars have attempted to
explain cultural patterns by using the evolutionary framework. In fact, the
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first cultural evolutionists introduced their conceptions before Darwin
published The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex ([1871]
2009). Nevertheless, they only accepted from Darwin’s work that which
fit their progressivist understanding of cultural evolution and, therefore,
misinterpreted his theory of natural selection (Kundt 2015). The massive
revival of utilizing the truly Darwinian paradigm in the study of culture
began in the 1950s (e.g., White et al. 1959) and culminated with the last
chapter of Edward O. Wilson’s Sociobiology (1975) in the 1970s, when the
Darwinian paradigm in the study of culture became an established scien-
tific field. Wilson mainly developed his views on human culture in his book
On Human Nature (1978) where he argued that human behavior and culture
are a result of the same evolutionary processes as animal behavior and that we
can, as a result, study these processes by applying the same methods em-
ployed in animal studies.
Sociobiology later branched into sub-disciplines, such as evolutionary
psychology (e.g., Tooby and Cosmides 1989) and human behavioral ecology
(e.g., Cronk 1991). However, before that separation, two other approaches
to the evolutionary study of culture, which were inspired by sociobiology
and anchored in Darwinism, emerged in the 1970s. The first of these
approaches was memetics (Dawkins 2006) and the second was the “dual-
inheritance theory” (Boyd and Richerson 1976), later called gene-culture
coevolution theory (GCCE) (Henrich 2016). Both theories came into being
during the 1970s; both understood culture as being subject to evolutionary
dynamics and being reducible to some cultural units, namely memes
(Dawkins 2006) or cultural variants (Richerson and Boyd 2005). Also, both
wanted to overcome the shortcomings of sociobiology by focusing on the
question of whether culture affects behavior in a way that is irreducible
to biology (Blackmore 1999; Boyd and Richerson 1982).
However, from their beginnings the theories proved to be different in cru-
cial aspects and, later, the proponents of the respected theories even argued
with each other (Blackmore 2016; Boyd and Richerson 2000). The funda-
mental difference between both theories was anchored in their approaches to
the concepts of “units of selection” (Lewontin 1970). While memeticists
considered culture to be reducible to gene-like units of cultural selection,
which they called “memes” and according to memeticists, often spread at
the expense of human fitness, GCCE theorists did not work with discrete
units but rather with cultural traits in general. Moreover, GCCE scholars
understood the human ability for cultural transmission to be an adaptation
and focused on the potential adaptive values that cultural traits might have
for their bearers (Boyd and Richerson 1995).
Approximately 40 years after the intellectual onset of GCCE and meme-
tics, it could be concluded that memetics is the approach that failed whereas
543Perspectives on Science
GCCE is generally accepted among many evolutionary scientists. The
development of a memetic framework was followed by many logical, theo-
retical, and empirical objections (Atran 2001; Bloch 2000; Boyd and
Richerson 2000; Coyne 1999; Kundt 2015; Kuper 2000; Sperber 2000;
Uhlíř and Stella 2012), but there are also more objective indicators of meme-
tics failure. First, currently only two well-known scholars could be identified
as active memeticists (Blackmore 2016; Dennett 2017). Also, Edmonds
(2005) shows that between 1986 and 2004, only 41 articles used the word
“memetics” indexed in the database Web of Science. Second, memeticists
themselves have realized that memetics is no longer considered a serious sci-
entific theory. This can be illustrated in the case of Kate Distin, the author of
the 2005 book The Selfish Meme, who wrote another book about cultural evo-
lution in 2011 and titled it Cultural Evolution. She used the word meme only
in references and in the appendix where she explains why she abandoned the
concept of the meme. She did so because the word is, according to her, a
considerable limitation and most people would not accept it if she would
have used it (Distin 2011). The Journal of Memetics is the third indicator. It
existed from 1997 to 2005 and during those eight years, only 41 original
studies and four commemorative studies were published. The journal was
discontinued in 2004 “due to a lack of quality submissions” (Edmonds
2005). In the commemorative issue of the Journal of Memetics Edmonds
(2005) admitted that the science of memes lost the competition with other
evolutionary accounts.
This brief list illustrates that memetics is no longer a “mainstream”
scientific theory, raising a simple but non-trivial question: Why? Before
proceeding to developing the question into more detail, the general frame-
work for understanding the concept of science in which the whole analysis
will be performed must be laid down. I follow the theory of Popper who
claimed that the purpose of his falsification concept is “to select the one
[theory] which is by comparison the fittest, by exposing them all to the
fiercest struggle for survival” (Popper 2002, p. 20). Also, I understand
science as a cultural institution where scientists decide what is and what
is not corroborated or falsified. Thus, I agree with Hull (1990), and Toulmin
(1972) that science is like an evolutionary arena where scientific concepts
and theories compete for acceptance by the scientific community. Hence,
the historical success of a theory could be measured by the number of scien-
tists who work with it and accept it. (Note that under no circumstances does
this framework propose that it can reveal an objective quality of science).
The question I asked seems to be very general and easy to answer: Because
the theory was wrong. After all, several studies revealed logical inconsis-
tencies in memetics. However, given the framework for understanding
the development of science, the question needs to proceed with thorough
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explanation of the crucial pitfall. One simple logic of natural selection
operates at the core of memetics. It is based on the idea that humans devel-
oped the ability to transmit information via a second, non-genetical channel,
namely the social or cultural learning that is conceptually separated from
biological fitness. The information transmitted through this channel is sub-
ject to variation (random errors during transmission or interpretation of that
information, and intentional changes) and competition (humans have only
limited memory) and therefore not all information could survive, resulting
in the process that I call memetic2 selection. This logic affords formulating
an at least partly adaptationist perspective on memetic evolution wherein
some memes’ survival depends most on their contribution to the biological
fitness of the bearer, yet the mainstream memeticists refused this view and
the majority of hypotheses that they proposed (e.g., memetic evolution of
religious traditions) were based on decoupling the link between biological
and memetic fitness. Memes, according to those authors, can propagate
themselves despite being non-adaptive or even maladaptive for the bearer
(Blackmore 1999; Brodie 2009; Dawkins 1993). As I will show later, it
was the adaptationist perspective that allowed GCCE scholars to formulate
testable predictions and hence succeed on the market of scientific theories.
Thus, the question should be laid down with a crucial clause: Why were
memeticists unable to rebuild the parts of their theory to meet the require-
ments of the scientific community even though the very general and flexible
memetic logic would allow it? The fact that memetics had the theoretical
potential to go the same way or to team up with GCCEmay be illustrated on
the recent blog post from Blackmore’s (2019) personal website. The text is
about the recent meeting of the MemeLab, which group people interested in
memetics who had regular meetings from 1998 to 2001 and then again, albeit
sporadically, from 2006. The last report reports about themeeting held August
17 and 18, 2019 where GCCE and memetics was discussed and Blackmore
admitted the possibility that they are actually the same theories.3
This study aims to determine whether there could have been any con-
straints that emerged during the diachronic development of the memetic
theory that could have impacted the way memeticists worked. However,
many factors impact the success of scientific theories, for example, on the one
2. I am probably alone in using this term, but it is necessary for distinguishing between
three possible levels of selection. Thus, I am using the concept of memetic selection to refer to
the natural selection operating on memes as units of cultural information. Throughout this
article, I will use also the term biological and genetical selection to refer to natural selectin
operating on genes.
3. “Is memetics the same as conventional cultural evolution theory (which is now growing
fast), or different? If they are the same, I might as well give up on memetics! And are there
testable predictions that would discriminate between them?” (Blackmore 2019).
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hand, the logical coherence and correctness of their theoretical assumptions
(for the review of these theoretical obstacles see Kundt 2015), on the other
hand, external factors such as the political and ideological environment in
which the theories are developed, as in the case of Lysenkoism (some of these
external factors surrounding the first reception of memetics are discussed in
Burman 2012). Therefore, it is necessary to note that this study admits all
these factors to be of potential relevance in the case of memetics failure but
focuses solely on one particular factor, which is the genealogical constraints
occurring during the internal development of the theory. Thus, the present
study is also a micro history―a case study4―that shows how the contextual
factors which are not external nor strictly internal influence the way scientific
theory changes and, in this case, even degenerate. I subscribe this way of
doing historiography under the conception of “a philosophical history of sci-
ence” (e.g., Burman 2017; de Freitas Araujo 2017).
My answer and the sketch of argument in this article goes as follows:
Although the theoretical core of memetics was flexible enough to formulate
different approaches, mainstream memeticists aimed to defend the position
that a substantial part of human culture is decoupled from the reproductive
fitness of the culture bearers. In doing so, memeticists needed to work out a
clear ontology of memes to make memes equally as strong as concepts as
genes, which is how the crucial part of the memetic research program was
formulated and many self-proclaimed memeticists were theoretically com-
mitted to developing meme ontology. This could be illustrated by pointing
out two parts of the memetic theory: While the majority of self-proclaimed
memeticists have agreed upon the basic theoretical assumptions such as
“culture as replicators” or “memetic transmission” (see the particular
sections of this paper), when dealing with the question “what are memes?”,
scholars formulated their own memetic ontologies achieving only a little
consensus among the memeticists. On the contrary, GCCE theorists did
not argue with each other about the empirically tricky questions such as
ontology and, instead, developed a framework that allowed them to model
and then test hypotheses about the dynamics of gene-culture coevolution.
The analysis of the context of the origins reveals that the commitment
toward the meme ontology and meme “selfishness” is the consequence of
the way memetics originated in the heart of Dawkins’ defense of Williams’
anti group-selectionists arguments. On the other hand, GCCE emerged as a
package of formal models examining the adaptive value of learning without
any conceptual but only empirical commitments. The following sections
elaborate on this argument, first introducing the two compared disciplines
and later comparing the main differences leading to failure/success thereof.
4. The concept of “case study” is understood in the same way as in Burian 2001.
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2. Memetics
The single term “memetics” provides a false notion that there is some unified
theory of memetics. However, this is not the case. Rather, the concept of
“memetics” and “memeticists” should be understood as emic terms that
refer to how scholars themselves understand their own work and scientific
identities.5 Popular and controversial auras surrounding the meme concept
during its beginning could contribute to the shared identity of those who
called themselves “memeticists” even though that they were often lonely
thinkers and the memetic framework has never been promoted to a research
program or at least a research line. There was a broader circle of “memeti-
cists” around the Journal of Memetics and tighter around Blackmore’s Meme-
Lab but, overall, students of prominent “memeticitsts” rarely inherited the
teachers’ theoretical heritage.
Thus, for the comparison it is necessary to remove the quotation marks
from the words “memeticists” and “memetics” by defining what I refer to
when using them. By memeticists I mean all authors who meet a first and
then at least a second or third of the following assumptions: 1) explicitly
endorsing Dawkins’ memetic legacy; 2) using the term meme with some
explanatory strength for cultural dynamics; 3) publishing in the Journal of
Memetics. There are also other potential indicators of being a memeticist.
For instance, Susan Blackmore runs a webpage where she maintains a list
of memeticists including lesser known scholars like Nicholas Rose, Paul
Marsden, and Hans Cees-Speel. Nevertheless, this list is subjective, and it
is probably the result of a very narrow relationship between people around
theMemeLab. Another possibility is to use mutual citations as an indicator of
being a memeticist; however, this would cast limitations on who to include
in the analysis. For example, Dennett in his 2017 book does not cite Distin’s
(2005), Jan’s (2007) or Aunger’s (2002) work. In other words, the memetic
citation patterns probably do not create a community and, at the same time,
the parameters that define what type of citation pattern counts as memetic
would be necessarily subjective.
With the outlined understanding ofwhomemeticists are, thememetics could
be seen, in my view, as a “core-periphery” research project. The core memetic
logic, which is accepted by all, was introduced above. The “periphery” term
refers to very broad theoretical and philosophical areas that are derived from
the core and flexible enough to afford a variety of positions in inter-memetics
5. I understand the term scientific identity in the way that sociologists do (Berger and
Luckmann 1967). Scientists construct their scientific identities during interactions with
their environment, that is through their connection with other scientists, journals where
they publish, conferences that they attend and articles that they read. However, these con-
structed identities are perceived as reality by individual researchers.
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discussions. The core memetics contains the conception of replication and the
basics of memetic transmission. On the other hand, more detailed insights into
the question how individual memeticists understood the key forces in the
memetic evolution and the discussion aboutmeme ontology produced substan-
tial amount of disagreement and resulted variation within the theoretical
framework.
2.1. The Core of Memetics – Replication and the Logic of
Memetic Selection
Replicator can be understood as a general type of entity―while gene is
seen as a biological replicator, meme is a cultural one (Distin 2005). That
is, the gene is the unit of biological selection (for the concept of units of
selection see Lewontin 1970), and analogically, meme should play the
same role in the memetic evolution of culture. Natural selection, according
to the general assumption, occurs when there is heritage (transmission),
variation (mutation), and competition (resource-limited environment).
The majority of memeticists agree that memes transmit through a type
of social learning or, more specifically, imitation (Blackmore 1998; Jan
2007; Lynch 1991). Transmission by social learning necessarily involves
random errors but, as opposed to genetic transmission, also intentional var-
iation, which occurs when people intentionally change the content of
memes. However, this is not a conceptual problem for calling the process
natural selection, since, according to Distin (2005), the conscious human
changes in meme content are blind to what is the best strategy in a par-
ticular environment. Competition among memes is created and facilitated
by space limits in human memory which memes compete for. Memes are
successful when they attract the attention of people and stay in their mem-
ory long enough to start and complete another transmission process.
Since meme is another autonomous replicator, it is not principally depen-
dent on biological evolution. This means that not all of the evolved cultural
features (memes or their co-adapted complexes, namely memeplexes) must
necessarily function as adaptations increasing the reproductive fitness of
their bearers. Memes primarily increase their fitness whereas increasing
the fitness of their bearers (humans) is only one of many possible ways to
do so.
The outstanding question is what makes memes successful? The core
memetics proposes that memes compete for human attention and a place
in human memory. In this case, the success of memes is determined mainly
by human psychology. Cognitive evolutionary scientists have identified
several themes and subjects that are very successful in attracting our atten-
tion and based on these findings, Brodie says that memes could be success-
ful because they can “push one or more of these four buttons—anger, fear,
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hunger, and lust” (Brodie 2009, p. 76). Another feature of memes, which
is dependent only on their content and which makes them successful, is
the so-called “evangelism.” These are memes or memeplexes containing
an instruction for spreading (Dawkins 1993). However, memes can also
travel in other memeplexes without contributing to the success of the
whole memeplex (Brodie 2009). This conceptual separation of biological
and memetic fitness, according to memeticists, opens up a new area for
explanatory possibilities. The most significant contribution of memetics
lies, according to its prominent advocate Blackmore, in the fact that it
can explain cultural maladaptations, i.e., traits that decrease the reproduc-
tive fitness of its bearers, e.g., religion (Blackmore 1999; Dawkins 2007).
2.2. The Periphery of Memetics – Who (Mainly) Benefits and Where
Memes Are?
However, some memeticists, though not many, argued that memes could
also contribute to the reproductive fitness of their bearers to promote meme-
tic fitness (Delius 1991). For example, Gottsch (2001) published a paper in
Journal of Memetics where he proposed a framework for understanding
successful transmission of “theistic” memes based on the idea, that those
memes, compared to alternatives, contribute to the reproductive fitness of
their bearers. Blackmore (1999) argued, that memes provided their bearers
with reproductive advantages at the beginning of the memetic evolution but
later, when the whole cognitive apparatus simplifying transmitting and
receiving memes evolved in humans, memes broke the imaginary chain that
made them subordinated to genes. From that time, memes were predomi-
nantly increasing memetic fitness and often creating biological maladapta-
tions such as ideologies and religions that are attractive for human cognition
but with negative consequences for human fitness. In Blackmore’s (1999)
view, this process was also facilitated by runaway dynamics of sexual selec-
tion. The view of religion (and other cultural phenomena) as cultural trait
with maladaptive effects on human genetic fitness was also proposed by
Dennett (2006), Dawkins (1993) and Brodie (2009).6
Though the interpretation of the conceptual separation of genetic and
memetic fitness produced some discrepancies between memeticists, much
higher variation in ideas was produced in the field of meme ontology. In other
words, memeticists have never agreed upon the question where/what memes
are. Wilkins (1999) differentiates between two basic camps: identifying those
6. Note that GCCE does not a priori oppose the claim that some cultural variants may
be maladaptive (at least in some socio-ecologies; see Richerson and Boyd 2001). The dif-
ference is that the mainstream memeticists made this the central claim of their theoretical
framework without enough empirical evidence.
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who put memes into the brain or mind as “pro-head”memeticists while those
who put memes outside the mind as “anti-head.” I will use this categorization
to describe the two basic camps.However, even inside these camps, researchers
did not fully agree upon the precise definitions.
2.3. “Pro-Head” Ontology of Memes
The first inceptions of the pro-head ontology can be traced back to Dawkins
(1982a) who considered human behavior to be the result of memes’ pheno-
typic effects. This idea was particularly expanded by Delius who proposed
that memes are units of information stored in the physical and chemical
structures of memory―in the “synaptic constellations” (Delius 1991,
p. 83). However, he argued that memes are not themselves neural constel-
lations but instead just meanings stored in them. The meaning and thus
the function of the meme could be the same even when it is stored in
different constellations (Delius 1991). This argument can be illustrated
by the metaphor: The same information, for example, a song, can be carried
on vinyl or a CD (compact disk).
A similar position is held by Aunger and Lynch. Aunger (2002) claimed
that a meme is a neuronal arrangement of one or more neurons into nodes.
He argued that “They [memes] are, in fact, electrical things—propensities
to fire—tied to the special type of cells called neurons (but are not the
neurons themselves)” (Aunger 2002, p. 196–197). In other words, memes
are extremely short states of mind. Lynch (1998) created his own terminol-
ogy of mnemons that he defined as abstract memory forms such as ideas,
attitudes or habits. Only mnemons that enter the mind as copies of other
mnemons and not situations themselves, are memes. For example, when an
earthquake erupts, many people have the mnemon of it, but it is derived
from the earthquake, and hence it is heteroderivative mnemon, not a
meme (Lynch 1991). However, when the earthquake is in the evening
news and the reporter talks about it, the mnemon of the earthquake be-
comes homoderivative, and thus it is a meme. Finally, to fully illustrate the
variance in the memetic ontology of pro-head scholars I briefly mention
Distin’s view. She considers memes to be mental representations with a
phenotypical effect outside the mind. She views memes to be information
inside the brain whereas behavior and physical objects are its phenotypes,
which natural selection operates on (Distin 2005).
2.4. “Anti-Head” Ontology of Memes
While the first group of memeticists puts memes into the brain or mind,
the second group puts memes outside of the human body. For example,
Benzon (1996) considers memes to be the whole of physical culture, such
as pots, knives, written words, radios, songs, and paintings. Ideas, desires,
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and emotions behind these physical entities are then analogous to the phe-
notype (Benzon 1996). Similarly, Gatherer (1998) argues that memetics
should be anchored mainly in the methodology of population thinking that
can count material objects. This is not possible with the pro-head approach
focused on mental representations as mathematical tools are of no use in this
case. The second reason to put memes outside of the brain, according to
Gatherer, is one of the pitfalls of the former approach: namely, that it is
not able to explain why memes are spreading. The reasoning is that we
cannot distinguish between copying and other forms of transmission. As
a consequence of these problems, he places memes outside of the brain.
The last anti-head memeticist introduced is Sterelny (2006). Overall,
Sterelny is skeptical about the possibility of explaining the cultural dy-
namics from the perspective of memes but should he admit their usage
in the cultural realm at all, he would place them into human-made arti-
facts. He introduces two reasons for this proposition. The first reason is
that the information does not copy itself; rather, it is re-constructed again
through innate or acquired cognitive modules of the human mind/brain.
The second reason is that when we place memes into the mind it is not
clear what memes should compete with as there is no useful memetic anal-
ogy to the alleles which are, in biology, particular forms of individual
genes (e.g., the gene for an eye color can have an allele for green or for
blue eyes). According to Sterelny (2006), if we think about memes as
artifacts, the problem is easier to solve. For example, different spears
compete for the tool status, which is how the variant is spread among
the population of spears that are actually created and used.
2.5. Other Approaches
It may appear puzzling that I did not include Blackmore and Dennett in
these two categories of meme ontology. This is because, in my interpre-
tation, neither of these two leading memeticists fits the criteria for the
“pro-head” and “anti-head” distinction introduced above, which adds extra
variation within the memetic periphery area.
Blackmore does not address the meme ontology. She argues that Darwin
himself did not have a gene unit at his disposal, and yet he was able to
formulate the theory of natural selection. Thus, she defines a meme as
anythingthat could be passed on by imitation and then she focuses on
applying the memetic logic to certain cultural phenomena. Moreover, she
prefers to use the term memeplexes instead of simple meme terms when she
describes the real-world memetic dynamics, and this allows her to avoid the
problem with the question of where a particular meme begins and where it
ends. Memeplexes are groups of mutually co-adapted memes that occur
together as one package since this has proven to be more successfully
551Perspectives on Science
transmitted compared to other memes (or memeplexes) in the population of
memes (Blackmore 1999). This logic recalls the application of a group
selection approach on the level of memes even though memeticists did
not labeled this process as “memetic group selection”. However, in general,
memeticists did not develop the concept of group selection in more detail
or, following Dawkins (2006), were even opposed to it, which will be dis-
cussed later in the article.
In Dennett’s case, it is difficult to decide where he places the memes. On
the one hand, he talks about a new entity―a person―created when memes
furnished and re-structuralized human brains (Dennett 1995). On the other
hand, he names pictures, books, words, and tools as meme vehicles. However,
whenwe follow the gene analogy―the vehicles containing the replicators that
created them―it follows that memes are embodied in artifacts. In his latest
advocacy of memetics, he explicitly claims, that “The theory I am [Dennett is]
defending declares, non-metaphorically and literally and without caveat, that
words are memes that can be pronounced” (Dennett 2017, p. 224). In an
answer to another objection, he adds that memes are not only words but also
their written codes, ways ofmaking arrows, axes, cooking,music, dancing and
other traditions (Dennett 2017). Based on these assumptions, we can catego-
rize him as both “pro-head” and “anti-head” ontology.
Finally, there were also other discussions where memeticists did not
achieve mutual agreement. Some of them were more than less conceptually
linked to the debate about ontology, namely the debate about proper
memetic analogies of concepts widely used in genetics such as “genotype”
(memotype)/phenotype distinctions (e.g., Benzon 1996; Distin 2005; Rose
1998) or memetic alleles (e.g., Dennett 2017; Distin 2005; Sterelny 2006).
Another discussion carried in Journal of Memetics was connected to the trans-
mission of memes and the extent to which only imitation (Blackmore 1998)
or also other forms of social learning (Laland and Reader 1999) are at play.
3. Gene-Culture Coevolution Theory
The term “gene-culture coevolution theory” also evokes the appearance of
one synthetic framework and although it definitely went through some
debates and significant changes during its development, it can be said that
it represents a much more complete account of the evolution of human
culture and nature than memetics. For example, I am using “GCCE”
(gene-culture coevolution) rather than DIT (dual-inheritance theory) or
simply cultural evolution. While DIT is used by Boyd and Richerson
(1976), in my view, it no longer reflects the scope of the theory. It is because
during twentieth century, the formal models presented mainly by Richerson
and Boyd described only the way biology designed human ability to learn
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and imitate as well as the dynamics of multiple types of cultural transmis-
sion. However, today the crucial aspect of the theory is the feedback loop
between culture and genes which is responsible for countless of human
genetical adaptations (Henrich 2016). Cultural evolution, on the other
hand, is too broad a concept and it would lead to conceptual confusion when
comparing withmemetics. Thus, by GCCE Imean the early work of Cavalli-
Sforza and Feldman (1981) and Boyd and Richerson (1985) on populational
thinking about cultural evolution and the further work that built on those
models, for example, recent experimental, cross-cultural and ethno-historical
examinations of the basic psychological and cognitive assumptions and
advanced hypotheses such as cultural group selection (Richerson et al. 2016),
tribal instincts (Richerson, Boyd, and Henrich 2003), and moralizing gods
(Norenzayan et al. 2016). I understand the models of adaptive value of social
learning and basic models of transmission biases as the core of the theory that
stands in opposition to the memetics’ focus on replicators, and the additional
GCCE hypotheses and different methodological perspectives as the more
flexible part during the diachronic theoretical development. However, unlike
memetics, GCCE’s two parts are highly consistent with each other, and also
the variety of approaches within the second part of GCCE development coher-
ently contributes to a mutual consensus. At the sociological level, GCCE
shows the coherence also at the level of relationships between scientists. We
can draw the imaginary line from Richerson and Boyd through Henrich to
Muthukrishna while the institutional stability of the approach is established
by multiple big projects (e.g., PULOTU, Database of Religious History) and
recently by an official organization called Cultural Evolution Society.7
3.1. Culture without Replicators
GCCE does not consider replication to be the central assumption of the evolu-
tionary theory but works with a more general term―heredity (Richerson and
Boyd 2005). Consequently, GCCE proponents conclude that there is no natural
selection of cultural units assumed by memetics. Instead, natural selection op-
erates primarily on behavioral phenotypes created by genetic and cultural trans-
mission, and their interactions with environmental conditions. This is why the
theory was originally called the “dual-inheritance theory” (Boyd and Richerson
1976): cultural species individuals are understood as entities subject to two sys-
tems of inheritance. The first system is the inheritance of biological traits and
the second is the inheritance of cultural traits. However, proponents of GCCE
do not posit a priori separation of cultural and genetical natural selection.
7. See the websites for individual projects: PULOTU (https://pulotu.shh.mpg.de),
DRH (https://religiondatabase.org/ landing/), and Cultural Evolution Society (https://
culturalevolutionsociety.org).
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In other words, whereas memetics understands natural memetic selection as
operating on memes (that is, on units of cultural replication with their own
reproduction fitness) and separated from natural selection acting on genes,
natural selection in the GCCE framework operates on cultural variants (as
memetic selection does) but also on individuals or groups. As a result, cultural
and genetic variants that generated relatively less adaptive phenotypes (behavior)
do not proceed to next generations. Therefore, the conceptual distinction of
cultural and genetical selection would create a false dichotomy within GCCE.
Two independent definitions of natural selection cannot be derived as there are
no two types of different replicators in the GCCE framework. Genetic selec-
tion and “memetic” selection are two sides of one coin―single concept of nat-
ural selection―and there is no reason to treat them separately.
3.2. Evolutionary Dynamics within the GCCE Framework
Cultural transmission differs from genetic transmission in several aspects,
which makes natural selection only one of several forces active in cultural
evolution. First, cultural information is transmitted by people from the
mind to the mind. Therefore, human psychology is a crucial factor that
affects what information will be transmitted and in what direction.
Cavalli-Sforza first suggested that while genes are transmitted only verti-
cally from parents to offspring, other types of transmission are present in cul-
tural transmission, for example, from older to younger individuals who are not
descendants of the older, between individuals within one generation, or by a
combination of these two channels. The first combination is a “many-to-one”
transmission, in which many others influence one individual. This transmis-
sion is essentially social pressure preserving cultural traits in the population.
The second type is a “one-to-many” transmission, in which many individuals
learn from one single individual. This is extremely important because due to
this process, cultural transmission becomesmuch faster than genetic transmis-
sion and can very quickly stabilize a cultural trait within the population
(Cavalli-Sforza 1986).
The concept of many-to-one transmission has developed into models of
conformist and prestige biases sometimes known as context biases. The
fundamental postulate is that in a population where individuals learn from
random individuals, it is unlikely for any adaptive trait to be retained and
stabilized. Therefore, Henrich and his colleagues argued that natural selec-
tion favors those individuals who are subject to a particular type of prej-
udice consisting of learning the most common traits among the population
(Henrich and Boyd 1998) or the traits of most successful individuals
(Henrich and Gil-White 2001). These learning biases reduce cultural var-
iation within the group and allow learners to learn the most likely adaptive
traits for the given conditions. After the introduction of the methods of
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experimental psychology into the previously mainly modeling framework
of GCCE, these two types of preferential transmission have begun to be
tested in a laboratory environment. If participants had the information
about the success of a model, they imitated those who were more success-
ful. When the models had the same success on average, the participants
imitated a more common strategy (McElreath et al. 2008).
Similar developmental pattern of theoretical considerations and later
empirical examinations with variety ofmethods could be found in the research
on other types of evolutionary forces such as content biases (Mesoudi 2016;
Mesoudi,Whiten, and Dunbar 2006; for non-GCCE aproach called cogntivie
attraction see Sperber 1996) or cultural drifts and dynamics behind reduction
of cultural complexity (Derex et al. 2013; Henrich 2004b; Muthukrishna
et al. 2013).
3.3. Cultural Group Selection (CGS)
Contrary to memeticists, GCCE theorists explicitly proposed the cultural
form of group selection as one of the fundamental contributions of GCCE
to evolutionary sciences (Richerson et al. 2016). They employed CGS to
answer specific standing puzzles about human behavior such as large-scale
anonymous cooperation. The traditional concept of group selection
(Wynne-Edwards 1962) proposed that altruistic behavior, which appears
to be disadvantageous to individuals, is the result of selection between
groups of individuals. Groups consisting of individuals who behave altru-
istically will be favored at the expense of those groups in which individuals
behave selfishly, even if some forms of altruistic behavior are disadvanta-
geous to the individuals themselves. Williams (1966, 1992) rejected this
argument because it would assume that animal groups contain sufficient
genetic variation and almost zero migration, and that group extinction rates
are frequent enough (sometimes more frequent than the death rates of
individuals) for selection among groups (inter-group selection) to overcome
selection within groups (intra-group selection). According to Williams
(1966), these conditions are just not fulfilled in reality, except for the occa-
sional exceptions.
However, GCCE theorists emphasize the role of culture in the process of
group selection (Henrich 2004a; Richerson and Boyd 2005), which
provides them with a strong argument against Williams. First, the groups
are protected by cultural boundaries and thus maintain high intragroup
homogeneity and intergroup variation, even in the case of high migration
rates (Richerson and Boyd 2008). Second, individuals from one group can
imitate individuals from a more successful group (Boyd and Richerson
2002). Third, the extinction of the group does not require the physical
death of all its members. Instead, they may be absorbed by a more successful
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group or the better cultural variant may attract more migrants from neigh-
bors who recognize that the group is more successful than their own (Boyd
and Richerson 2010). In other words, points two and three indicate that
cultural transmission accelerates the frequency of group extinction. As a re-
sult, the cultural version of group selection fits Williams’ criteria. Moreover,
Soltis, Boyd, and Richerson (1995) tested their CGS hypothesis with data
from Papua New Guinea, investigating how often culturally defined groups
become extinct and whether the cultural variation between groups affects
the survival rates of these groups for long enough so that CGS could operate
on these groups. They calculated that CGS operates within the range of 500
to 1000 years and thus provides the required empirical support for the CGS
hypothesis.
3.4. Coevolution of Culture and Genes
While it was argued in the previous paragraphs that genes together with
the process of natural selection shape culture, GCCE proponents argue that
culture may also impact gene frequencies. Cumulative cultural evolution
creates a stable environment, which in turn, applies selective pressure on
individuals and favors those who can better exploit the opportunities that
culture brings about. The most common example of the coevolution of
genes and culture is the spread of the gene that controls the production
of the lactase enzyme, which allows its bearer to break down lactose, milk,
and sugar. In most cases, lactose intolerance begins at around the age of
five. The ingestion of milk may then cause serious health issues. However,
the majority of European and American population is lactose tolerant after
the age of five (they developed lactase persistence). According to the logic
of coevolution of culture and genes, the reason is that this particular gene
spreads together with the cultural trait of animal domestication. The sooner
cattle farming is adopted in a specific world region, the higher the distri-
bution of the lactose-digesting gene is found within its population. The
reason is that mutants who were able to benefit from the high availability
and nutritional value of milk, even after reaching five years of age, had an
advantage over those who could not (Henrich 2016; for more comprehen-
sive review see Gerbault et al. 2011).
One of the most critical hypotheses based on the concepts of CGS and the
coevolution of genes and culture is the “tribal social instincts hypothesis”
(Richerson et al. 2003). This hypothesis serves to explain human cooperation
in large anonymous groups. The argument is that CGS first created cultural
social institutions that were maintained by social sanctions. This means
that if the individual does not follow the standards of the institution, the
rest of the group will often restrict his/her access to essential resources or
ostracize this individual. The existence of these standards gives the group
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an advantage because it reduces intragroup conflict and minimalizes defec-
tion. Social institutions then create a new selective environment that favors
individuals with the psychology that allows them to live more easily within
these norms. People who have, for example, emotions of shame, guilt,
empathy, ethnic identity, and hatred (Gintis et al. 2003) are better prepared
to obey social norms within a given group and are less often subject to social
punishment or ostracism. Therefore, individuals with these emotions are
more likely to survive long enough and to be successful in the reproduction
market in such a norm-structured society (Boyd and Richerson 2008).
4. Comparison
When we compare the diachronic development and basic conceptual appa-
ratus of both theories on a very general level, several clear differences are
striking. These are coherence, adaptationist view of culture, cultural group
selection, ontology and diachronic development. However, the question is
whether and how these differences contributed to the memetic failure. I
argue, that the crucial aspect of coherence was predominantly adaptationist
approach to culture taken by GCCE scholars which was impacted by the
context of the origin as mathematical models of human ability to learn
socially. Also, the later development proved to benefit from the adapta-
tionist perspective because the adaptationist models allowed to derive and
test numerous predictions. The environment around GCCE that was not
loaded by gene-centered and anti-group-selectionist ideology allowed the
formulation of an hypothesis of cultural group selection which in turn helped
with developing projects around moralizing gods and tribal instincts hypotheses in
interaction with culture-gene coevolution. Contrary, memeticists found
themselves struggling with meme ontology as they needed to meet the
requirements of the memetic ideological heritage.
The difference in the level of the theory’s inner coherence is striking.
On the one hand, GCCE shows high levels of mutual consensus between
the first (Boyd and Richerson), second (Henrich) and third (Muthukrishna)
generation of researchers while two recent generations built on the con-
cepts and findings of the first generation. On the other hand, memetics
resembles a partially connected network of lonely thinkers. The fragmen-
tation of memetics is clearly evident from the example of ontology which
was, from the beginning, project with very dubious point since the
ontological claims lacked either the semantical structure of testable prop-
ositions or the tests were impossible to perform with the actual technolog-
ical equipment (Coyne 1999). The lack of aspiration for being tested
explicitly was admitted by Dennett when he attempted to immunize
memetics by claiming that it stands on behalf of scientific approach to
557Perspectives on Science
culture.8 For self-proclaimed memeticists, it was subjectively crucial to
work on meme ontology if they wanted to further develop the theory. After
all, finding a structure that carries memetic information would legitimize
the postulation of the second memetic replication system in the same sense
that finding a physical gene has legitimized evolutionary biology. If there
is a second replication system, it must be anchored somewhere, otherwise
the natural memetic selection does not have anything on which to operate.
The same factor also led memeticists to develop analogies to other concepts
from genetic evolution such as memetic “genotypes” (memotypes)/pheno-
types or memetic alleles. However, above I showed that the logic of meme-
tic selection did not automatically assume empirical separation of genetic
and memetic fitness and the core memetic logic allowed for genetically
adaptive understanding of memes and memeplexes. The question that
now needs to be investigated and answered is what constraints within
the development of the theory committed the majority of memeticists to
work on ontology and to adhere to the non-adaptive, virus-like approach to
culture (Blackmore 1999; Brodie 2009; Dawkins 1993; Dennett 1995;
Lynch 1996). In answering the question, I will proceed to compare the
context of the origins of both theories.
Memetics originated as a single chapter in one book (Dawkins 2006,
chap. 11). One of the primary aims of The Selfish Gene was to popularize
and develop Williams’ (1966) arguments for a gene-centered view in evolu-
tionary biology. Williams argued that the ultimate unit of selection in
biology is a gene; not an individual and not a group of individuals. Dawkins
(2006) developed Williams’ (1966) approach in such a way as to make the
concept of evolution more general. He argued that genes are replicators and
that replicators are substrate-independent entities that transfer information.
To clarify his argument, he introduced an example of another possible repli-
cator, namely the memes. The function of that chapter was originally not to
introduce a full theory nor had he an ambition to do it. Dawkins’ chapter on
memetics was rather a pedagogical tool that had to help readers to under-
stand the logic of replicators. Burman (2012) argues that with this inmind it
is no surprise that it took approximately one decade for the meme concept to
became famous and that this success is thanks to Dennett, and Hofstadter
transferred Dawkins’ original pedagogical argument to the new context
of serious mind investigations all reprinted in a popular edited collection
without any explanation (Hofstadter and Dennett 1982).
8. “It might be, for example, that, although the processes of cultural transmission of
ideas are truly Darwinian phenomena, for various reasons they resist being captured in a
Darwinian science, so we will have to settle for the ‘merely philosophical’ realizations we
can glean from this, and leave science to tackle other projects” (Dennett 1995, p. 346).
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Modern biology is built on the concept of a gene that is considered to be the
replicator. The gene-centered approach to biological evolution, currently the
only feasible paradigm in biology, cannot consider evolution without genes or
gene-like units. The context of the origins of the gene-centered evolutionary
theory and the authority of Williams and Dawkins made it imperative to
search for the units of cultural selection. Scholars who understood themselves
as memeticists had to accept another part of the memetic researcher identity,
namely the rest of Dawkins-Williams argumentation. Replicator-centered
view of evolution and the idea of culture as an entirely natural (evolutionary)
phenomenon together constructed the identity of the memeticist. Thus,
memeticists inherited a fascinating idea of cultural evolution but also the com-
mitment to replicators. The idea of cultural replicator, however, was not a
properly built scientific concept but only a popular analogy and the process
of developing the concept and the physical unit of the gene was entirely dif-
ferent from the process of developing a meme and its ontology, leading to the
scientific success of the former but not the latter concept.
In the case of the gene-centered evolutionary theory, there was first the
work of Gregor Mendel on pea crossing and then the independent theory
of natural selection which were later, after many conflicts between Mende-
lians, embryologists, statisticians, paleontologists, and other biologists,
fused into the modern evolutionary synthesis (Sapp 2015). Subsequently
and independent of the development of the evolutionary theory, molecular
biologists identified the genetic information in the physical structure of
DNA (Watson and Crick 1953). Thus, when Dawkins made his generaliza-
tion from a gene to a replicator, he already knew that there is an exact phys-
ical ontology of the gene. However, when he introduced the abstract concept
of a replicator into the study of culture, memeticists had no previous work
analogous to the work of Watson and Crick at their disposal. What they had
was limited to a highly speculative argument about a substrate-independent
replicator. They posited the existence of a meme and then tried to ontolog-
ically capture memes in the same way as genes were ontologically captured
by Watson and Crick (1953). This obsession was due to the argumentation
from which memetics emerged, namely that there can be no adequate theory
of evolution using natural selection without the units of replication.
The diachronic development of the meme ontology may be reconstructed
as follows: first, there was an ontology of the gene (DNA); second, Dawkins
made an inference from gene to a general replicator; subsequently, he
inferred from a replicator to a meme. Thus, the “hunt” for the ontology of
memes commenced. The process of the emergence of meme ontology was
precisely opposite that of the process of the emergence of gene concept.
On the other hand, GCCE diachronic genealogy is akin to evolutionary
biology. It began as the package of formal mathematical models exploring
559Perspectives on Science
the adaptive value of the organism’s ability to have a culture through the lens
of populational thinking. Authors of GCCE explicitly stated that in popu-
lational thinking they were inspired by Darwin. Although this statement,
moreover when proposed retrospectively (Richerson and Boyd 2001), could
represent the need for having big father founders to legitimize the existence
of system of ideas that scientific theory definitely is, it also shows how
authors themselves perceived their theory. They did not understand it as a
new paradigm unifying all social sciences like some of memeticists (Brodie
2009; Gatherer 1997; Lynch 1996), but they linked their ideas and
approaches to Darwin and also Campbell (Richerson and Boyd 2001)
who did not have the concept of units of selection at their disposal. Boyd
and Richerson developed their ideas from the beginning as a systematic
theory for understanding cultural change not by first publishing the overall
framework, but with small pieces of formal evidence (Boyd and Richerson
1976, 1983, 1995, 1996). Their first book on GCCE was, rather than
popular introduction of the whole theory, another set of formal models (Boyd
and Richerson 1985). In their second book, they admitted that they were not
interested in the question of ontology and that they worked with phenotyp-
ical depictions of cultural traits similar to the way behavioral ecology works
with behavioral traits without saying anything about the genes (Richerson
and Boyd 2005). Contrary to memeticists, GCCE scholars were committed
to an adaptationist perspective that is present within evolutionary ecology
and protected from being primed by the replicator-based style of thinking,
opening up the possibility of uniting scientists from various disciplines
under one theoretical umbrella and dealing with the subsequent empirical
challenges.
Note that my claims about adaptationist and ontology commitments do
not represent evaluative propositions. The logic underlying these claims
results from the theoretical assumption presented in the introduction. The
quantity of scientists working with the theory “creates” its success and
working with the theory in most cases means to test it. Thus, although it is
not clear whether the adaptationist paradigm is objectively better for evolu-
tionary sciences than, for example, the “by-product” paradigm (Gould and
Lewontin 1979), the approach that allows for more predictions will attract
more empirical scientists.9 Following this logic, to make the core of the theory
general enough allows for an increase in the number of scientists working with
it. However, one also has to ensure that the interdisciplinaritywill not split the
9. In a recent article, Muthukrishna and Henrich (2019) argue that the current crisis
in psychology is caused by lack of proper formal general theory with clear predictions rather
than by poor methodology. According to their subsequent argumentation, GCCE is one of
the examples of such a needed theory.
560 Why Did Memetics Fail?
theory, which, in comparison with GCCE, happened to memetics when
diverse educational backgrounds divided memeticists in their thoughts on
meme ontology. The adaptationist (yet not entirely adaptationist; see Richerson
and Boyd 2001) orientation of GCCE more likely connected the theory
with measurable reality, which in turn, precluded GCCE researchers from
speculation-driven splitting up. What benefits can we assign to adaptationist
perspective on culture in GCCE?
First, adaptationism enabled researchers to formulate more detailed predic-
tions about cultural variability, behavior, and its impact on biological fitness.
Inversely, the focus on decoupling memetic fitness from the biological fitness
means, for instance, that cultural practices should spread independently of
ecological factors and thus the status of its hypotheses is similar to the null
hypotheses (Linquist 2016).
Second, it allowed formulating the coevolutionary aspect of the theory
with clear-cut predictions about variation in gene frequencies in world
populations (e.g., Chiao and Blizinsky 2010). Memeticists also introduced
a hypothesis that could be called coevolutionary, such as the hypotheses of
big brains (Blackmore 1999). According to this hypothesis, once memes
appeared, they applied selective pressure on genes to create better imitators
and thus bigger brains. This process, possibly influenced by the runaway
acceleration of sexual selection, eliminated those individuals who were not
good at imitation, even though the memes which they imitated could be
disconnected entirely from the individual reproductive fitness. This logic
is also applied in other memetic hypotheses as well, for example, the expla-
nation of language (Blackmore 1999; Vaneechoutte and Skoyles 1998) or
consciousness (Dennett 1991). However, similar to the argument in the pre-
vious paragraph, due to the decoupled memetic and biological fitness, it is
not clear under which ecological circumstances should the meme-gene co-
evolution occur and how to test it.
Third, the adaptationist view of culture enabled GCCE researchers to
build on the robust functionalist tradition in anthropology that dates back
to Durkheim (2011) as well as on more recent ecological anthropology
(Rappaport 1968) and human behavioral ecology (Cronk 1991) projects.
In contrast, memetics was supposed to be a “new science” (Brodie 2009)
and a new scientific paradigm (Lynch 1996) built on older less-known
French sociology (Marsden 2000) that detached itself from well-established
disciplines such as more traditional functional and cultural anthropology
(Douglas 1966; Rappaport 1979) and behavioral ecology (Cronk 1991).
Finally, the adaptationist view enabled theorists to also develop the con-
cept of CGS, which in turn, led to GCCE theories of human ultrasociality
(Boyd and Richerson 2009; Richerson and Boyd 1998; Richerson et al.
2003; Tomasello 2009; Turchin 2016). On the contrary, the pioneer of
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memetics Dawkins (1982b, 2006) explicitly built on the ideas of Williams
(1966) who argued against group selection in biology. Thus, one would
expect that memeticists did not utilize any ideas of the contemporary
group―today called multi-level―selectionists (Wilson and Sober 1989;
Wilson et al. 2008). However, this was not the case. They utilized group
selection logic exactly when they theorized about memeplexes because they
understood memeplexes as groups of memes ideally spreading as units
(Blackmore 1999). Therefore, ideologies and religious doctrines could be
understood as “memetic group adaptations.” This prima facie confusion
arises due to the differences in the concept of natural selection. There is
just one concept of natural selection in the GCCE framework whereas there
are two separate concepts of natural selection in the memetic framework
with each of these operating separately on different replicators. Memeticists
then focused on the selection operating on cultural units where, as we could
see, they employed the logic of group selection. However, they did not have
the necessary theoretical apparatus to develop the CGS concept in the same
way as GCCE, namely, to grasp theoretical “memetic group selection” as
operating on groups of people. Therefore, their anti-group-selectionist
theoretical heritage of the argument (Dawkins 2006; Williams 1966) from
which memetics emerged prevented them from using the concept of group
selection in the same way as the proponents of GCCE did. This also pre-
vented them from even using the term in the memetic realm although they
worked with the very same logic when dealing with memeplexes.
5. Conclusion
Two theories of cultural evolution were analyzed and compared in this study,
namely memetics and culture-gene coevolution theory. The goal of this
comparison was to unmask the causes of the historical failure of memetics. I
compared both theories on the theoretical level and also on the level of their
diachronic development. The conclusion is that the failure of memetics lies in
its overly constrained origins in gene-centered argumentation in evolutionary
biology and in Dawkins’ authority that pre-determined all the scholars who
wanted to work within the framework of memetics to preoccupy themselves
with the strict separation ofmemetic and genetic fitness andwith the ontology
of memes, as opposed to the formulation of empirically testable hypotheses.
Compared to GCCE, this, in turn, made memetics less attractive to empiri-
cally oriented scientists.
Nevertheless, it would be naive to consider my explanation to be the
only one. I see two possible additional factors that are, in my view, comple-
mentary to the approach taken in this study. First, Burman (2012) found
the connection between the fast and sudden spread of memetics during the
late 1980s and 1990s and the rise of individualistic ideologies in the USA
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and Great Britain. We can speculatively extend this link to our question
and ask whether these ideologies could not shield memetics against the
concepts of adaptiveness and cultural group selection. The second possible
factor is the way memetics was publicized and disseminated, namely very
often in popular books without peer reviews and open scientific discussion
(e.g., Brodie 2009; Tyler 2011).
Finally, I consider this study to be only an attempt at explaining why
memetics is no longer in the mainstream in the study of the evolution of
human culture. Here, I also stress the notion from the Introduction that
this work should be understood as an attempt to do micro history case
study of modern science rather than a final analysis. I see three possible
ways of future research arising from it. The first is to examine the precise
similarities and differences in the development of the gene and meme con-
cepts, which would require an extensive study of the history of biological
disciplines in the first half of the twentieth century. The second is to focus
more on the sociological aspects and ask whether there were any external
factors impacting the gradual rejection of memetics, such as the number of
more senior researchers among memeticists, the number of grants awarded,
and therefore the amount of money that was available to them, or the anal-
ysis of the arguments of Dennett and Dawkins in their public debates to
determine whether they used memetics as an ideological anti-theistic tool.
Finally, following recent debates on the intersection between history and
philosophy of science (e.g., Arabatzis and Schickore 2012; Araujo 2017),
this micro-historical analysis should be framed within a broader picture of
how scientific theories evolve, change and “die.”
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